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1 Introduction
In choosing any policy, whether it be a regulation or a pricing scheme, it
is important to consider the social goals of the policy. Social goals might
include things like equity, giving incentives for conservation, or economic ef-
¯ciency. Considering the scarcity of water resources in many parts of the
world, an important area of research is the e®ect of di®erent water pric-
ing schemes. The water-pricing scheme can be chosen to a®ect the total
quantity of water demanded by consumers. However, other concerns may
be addressed via the chosen pricing scheme as well. Equity issues between
di®erent water users, and economic e±ciency of water use can be addressed.
Historically many water systems have used average cost pricing as a way
to recover costs. Increased water scarcity leads us to consider water reform
systems that move away from average cost pricing towards systems aimed to
promote conservation and increased water use e±ciency.
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1If the goal of water pricing policy is economic e±ciency, then water mar-
kets are a ¯rst-best solution. There is an extensive literature on the op-
timality of water markets to achieve the most e±cient allocation of water
use. This literature began with the work of Burness and Quirk [1]. They
argue that if water rights are tradable between heterogeneous water users,
the most e±cient outcome will result. In this literature, there isn't a need
to mention the role of a water agency, because bargaining between parties
will achieve the economically e±cient (¯rst-best) outcome. This argument
relies on a lack of transaction costs for water trading. Because of the high
costs involved with water storage and conveyance, transaction costs may be
prohibitive to trading in water, especially between non-adjacent land areas.
When the required assumptions do not hold, there is a role for a water agency
in determining water prices and allocations to users.
A ¯rst-best pricing policy is to price water at the marginal cost of sup-
ply. If budget balance is required, this should be achieved through non-
distortionary (lump sum) transfers. We will derive the ¯rst-best pricing out-
come and compare it to several second-best pricing policies, including tiered
pricing and average pricing. This analysis will be done for agricultural water
supplied to land that is heterogeneous in quality, and will require budget
balance of the water utility. Water agencies are often constrained to a zero
pro¯t condition. This is particularly true of a state-owned water utility, or
in a place like California where many water districts are run for the bene¯t
of their members.
Despite the fact that the economic e±ciency of water trading or marginal
cost pricing has been well-established, the number of water systems through-
out the world that use such systems is close to zero. Some may argue that
equity considerations are important in this choice. This paper develops a
framework to analyze the equity and e±ciency of various water pricing op-
tions, including tiered pricing. It recognizes that water users are heteroge-
neous in their characteristics and demand, and this heterogeneity will have
to be incorporated in the design and assessment of alternative water pricing
mechanisms.
2 Empirical Model
Let y denote output per acre; x, applied water per acre; and °, land quality.
Land quality varies from ° to ° with density g(°). The production function
2per acre is y = f(x;°) with fx > 0, fxx < 0, and f° > 0, where the subscripts
denote partial derivatives. We normalize the price of output to equal one,
and all other prices are relative to the price of output.
There is a ¯xed cost per acre, denoted by k. This includes the costs
of preparing the land for planting and controlling pests. For simplicity, we
assume that this cost does not depend on the size of a farm or on the quality
of the land. The parameter ±(°) indicates the proportion of land with quality
° used for a speci¯c crop by the farmer. Aggregate water use is denoted by
X, and the cost of providing water is composed of a ¯xed cost, denoted by
F and a variable cost, denoted by V(X), with V 0 > 0 and V 00 > 0. It is
generally assumed that the marginal cost of supplying water increases as the
total quantity supplied increases. This is because the least expensive water
sources are generally developed ¯rst. Increasing the supply of water requires
deeper pumping of groundwater, or the delivery of surface water from further
away.
3 Measuring E±ciency and Equity
A component that is crucial to the work we present in this paper is the choice
of an appropriate measure for both e±ciency and equity.
3.1 Measurements of Inequality
There are several choices available for a measure of inequality. The ¯rst is
the percentage of the population facing a certain input price who are priced
out of the market entirely (the percentage without access to the resource).
In a similar vein, we could de¯ne the measure of inequality as the percentage
of the population whose input use is less than xL, where xL is de¯ned as a
'lifeline quantity', or a minimum subsistence level. For example, estimates
of the minimum necessary quantity of water per capita for consumption and
sanitation range from 20 to 40 liters ([4]). While these inequality measures
are somewhat crude, the bene¯ts of using them is that they are relatively
easy to understand and calculate. Previous work had used a similar type
of measure of inequity. In a study of a government run irrigation system in
the Philippines, Ferguson [3] uses the amount of land that does not receive
su±cient irrigation water as a measure of inequity.

















































Figure 1: Measuring Inequality
cumulative distribution functions of the resource use patterns by population.
We de¯ne h(°) as the density function of the percentage of total resource use,
and H(°) as the cumulative distribution function of total resource use, with
H(°) = 0 and H(°) = 1. We compare distributions of resource use and con-
sider one to be more equitable than another if it second-order stochastically
dominates the other.
An example of this is in Figure 1. In Figure 1, we graph the distribution of
the population (G(°)), along with two possible distributions for cumulative
water use. We denote these with H1(°) and H2(°). Using the second-order
stochastic dominance criteria, we consider H1(°) to achieve a higher level of
equity than H2(°). If some proportion of the population has zero consump-
tion of the resource, the distribution function will be °at over a range of
values of °, and then will increase.
3.2 Measurements of Ine±ciency
In existing water pricing systems throughout the world, ine±ciencies can
result from many sources. These include a lack of appropriate pricing and
subsidies on other costs associated with water use, such as electricity, among
many others ([5], [6]). However, in this paper we assume that producers do
4not have market power to in°uence input prices, and that other inputs to
production, such as electricity, fertilizers, or labor are priced without market
distortions.
When a water utility charges the same price for each unit consumed, as
with marginal or average cost pricing, the measurement of ine±ciency is fairly
straightforward. We consider the measure of ine±ciency as the deadweight
loss resulting from a suboptimal allocation of resources. By de¯nition, this
is the area between the marginal cost and marginal bene¯t functions above
the optimal level of resource use. However, we make a slight simpli¯cation
and approximate this using the area of a triangle, and denote the measure





When a water utility charges di®erent prices based on the level of con-
sumption, the measurement of ine±ciency is a little more complicated. Ex-
amining the amount of ine±cient water use in this scenario requires us to
consider the proportion of the population that do not buy their last unit at
marginal cost, instead of the total amount of the resource purchased below
marginal cost.
4 Optimal Allocation Rule
In this section we develop the optimal pricing rule for a utility that sells
water at a constant price to its customers. We assume that the amount of
water demanded at a given price increases as ° (land quality) increases.
We model the rent per acre (r(°)) as the following:
r(°) = (f(x(°;w);°) ¡ k ¡ wx(°;w)) (1)
4.1 Individual Pro¯t Maximization
We begin by modeling a pro¯t-maximizing farmer, who has to decide whether
to produce, given the quality of his land and the price of water. We model
the optimization problem as follows:
max
x(°;w);±(°)
(f(x(°;w);°) ¡ k)±(°) ¡ wx(°;w) (2)
Farmers will decide to plant on an acre (±(°) = 1) if the total revenues
exceed the total costs. If total costs exceed total revenues, the land will
5be left fallow or used for some other crop and ±(°) = 0. There exists a
critical land quality (°L) where the rent per acre is zero. At this point,
f(x(°L;w);°L)¡k = wx(°L;w). At this land quality, total revenue per acre
equals total cost. This separates a region of higher quality lands that will be
fully farmed from lower quality lands that will not be farmed. The lowest
land quality in use, °L is a function of k, and w. From this result, we ¯nd
the following:
±(°) = 1 and r(°) > 0 for ° > °L(k;w)
±(°) = 0 and r(°) · 0 for ° · °L(k;w)
On any acre with positive production, water use will be determined by
the price of output (p), the price of water (w), and the land quality (°). A





In subsequent sections, we de¯ne x¤(°;w) as the pro¯t maximizing level
of input use for an individual with land quality ° facing input price w, and
y¤(°;w) = f(x¤(°;w);°) as the pro¯t maximizing choice of output.
4.2 Social Optimality
Taking the behavior of an individual farmer as given by equations 2 and 3,
we consider the optimization problem facing a social planner who charges






¤(°;w) ¡ k)±(°)g(°)d° ¡ F ¡ V (X) (4)
Deriving the ¯rst order conditions for a social optimum shows that, as
expected, the price of the input (water) should equal the marginal cost of
provision. Therefore, we de¯ne w¤ = V 0(X).







6This equilibrium is likely to violate the no-pro¯t condition for a utility. If
Xw¤ > F + V (X) the utility accumulates pro¯ts. If a zero pro¯t condition
is imposed, then any pro¯ts or losses will have to be distributed in a non-
distortionary manner. For example, each acre of land may receive a share of
the pro¯ts, or pay a per-acre fee to cover the losses. In practice, this type
of mechanism is unrealistic due to the di±culty in implementation. For this
to be non-distortionary, these rebates/fees have to be independent of the
amount of water a farmer uses, the crop he/she grows, or if he/she leaves
land fallow.
5 Average Cost Pricing
Average cost pricing is often used when a utility is constrained to zero pro¯ts.
However, the use of average cost pricing is economically ine±cient, because
the marginal cost of providing water to the user doesn't equal the price
the user pays for water. If ¯xed costs (F) are small relative to variable
costs (V), the average cost will be below the marginal cost. It is usually
assumed that this is the case. There are a few reasons for this. One reason
is that the conveyance and storage costs (variable costs) of supplying water
are high. Also, the government or an outside agency often subsidize the ¯xed
costs of developing a water project. This has been true in both developed
and developing countries. For example, in the United States, most of the
water projects in the Western United States were either paid for or highly
subsidized by the federal government. In many developing countries, water
projects have been built from external funding received by agencies such as
the World Band or the International Monetary Fund. When ¯xed costs aren't
a concern, those managing the water simply want to recover the variable costs
of water provision.
In the following, we use a superscript A to denote behavioral choices under
average-cost pricing, and a superscript * to denote behavior under marginal-
cost pricing. We denote the water price by wA, which is determined so that
total revenues just cover the total costs of water provision, as shown below:
w
A =




As above, we de¯ne the lowest quality of land in operation by °A
L. Given
these conditions, if it is pro¯table to operate, a farmer will choose to apply














Average cost pricing can lead to ine±cient water use. This is because
water users are not choosing quantities at the margin e±ciently. When wA is
less than w¤, too much water will be demanded at the margin. The change
in total water use will be both at the intensive and at the extensive margins,
as shown below.
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change at the extensive margin
(5)
Proposition 1 The welfare loss under average cost pricing is increasing in
the slope of the variable cost function (V (X)), and decreasing in the rate of
change of yield (f(x;°)) to greater levels of inputs.
Proof of Proposition 1: See appendix.
6 Tiered Pricing Solution
A tiered pricing system is a way to provide budget balance of the water
utility, but to also have marginal cost pricing at higher levels of water use.
This will provide the incentives for e±cient water use at the margin, as well
as addressing equity concerns.
The pricing system is an increasing block rate system. This type of system
is commonly used in electricity markets. However, it has been largely ignored
8in the water literature. With tiered pricing, there will be a certain amount
of water allocated to each acre of land in production at a low price. This
quantity will be denoted by x0, and it is available at a price of w0. For
any water above x0, the price will equal the marginal cost of provision, wM.
There are several reasons that an increasing block rate pricing system would
be used in water pricing. The ¯rst reason is for economic e±ciency - it
changes the price of the last unit of water used, so that at the margin a user
chooses water use e±ciently. Another reason could be for equity reasons. If
it is a priority of agricultural policy to keep small family farms in business,
it might motivate a tiered-pricing policy. If small farms that require less
water pay a reduced price, it would help to keep those farmers in business
(essentially, this would be a transfer from large farmers to small farmers).
The model here is of an allocation per production acre. There are other
ways that a tiered pricing system could be implemented. For example, a
water user could be allocated some percentage of their historical usage at a
low rate. In this case, the allocated quantity will be x0(°), instead of having
the allocation constant among users. Another possible scenario is that each
grower receives a certain allocation of water for a low price, regardless of the
number of acres the grower farms. However, we argue that if there is large
heterogeneity across farm sizes and land quality, the most feasible system is
a per acre allocation.
Since the quantity of water demanded at a given price increases as land
quality (°) increases (due to greater input-use e±ciency), lower quality lands
will buy at the lower price w0, while the higher quality land will receive their
allocation, and will buy more water at the higher price wM. Mathematically,
this assumption can be stated as if °1 > °2, then x¤(°1;w) > x¤(°2;w)8w.
Using the tiered pricing system will create up to 4 categories of water users,
based on land quality. Some of these categories may be empty for certain
land distributions or for certain values of the parameters.
1. The ¯rst category includes those who cannot farm pro¯tably at water
price w0. As with the optimal solution, there will be some value of land
quality that separates the land that is in production from land kept
fallow. We de¯ne °L(k;w0) as the lowest quality land in production.
2. The second category is those who set marginal product equal to price
w0. Here we de¯ne °S
L(x0;w0) as the highest quality land that uses
water at price w0 e±ciently.
93. The third category is those who use water ine±ciently - they buy x0
at price w0, but in doing so they are not setting the value of marginal
product equal to the input price. They would be willing to buy more
water, but not at price wM.
4. The fourth category is those who use water e±ciently at the high price
of wM. The lowest level of land quality in this group is °S
H(x0;wM),
which we de¯ne as the lowest quality land that uses water at price wM
e±ciently.
An example of this is in Figure 2. In this ¯gure, there are only three
types of user characteristics that shape the demand for water. We de¯ne
these three types as °L, °M, and °H. When faced with the same level of
input price, each type demands a di®erent quantity of water. Demand from
each type is shown with its respective marginal bene¯t curve, denoted by
MB(°i). Given the choice of x0 and w0 shown in the ¯gure, the only group
of users that purchase water at an e±cient level is °H. Therefore, °H is in the
fourth category of users de¯ned above. The ¯rst group, °L is in the second
category, while the second group, °M, is in the third category. There are no
users in the ¯rst category, since all buy some amount of water at the low
price (w0).
The land qualities that separate these categories are functions of the
parameters of the problem, as shown below. The exogenous variables in
the problem are k, and F. Continuing the notation from earlier, we use a
superscript T to denote behavioral choices under tiered pricing.



















M)) ¡ k)g(°)d° ¡ F ¡ V (X
T) (6)
Subject to the following two conditions:





























































































H;wM) = x0 (11)
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0(°;wM) = wM 8 ° s:t: °
S
H(x0;wM) · ° · ° (13)
11Setting ¸1 as the shadow value of the budget constraint, and ¸2 as the
shadow value of marginal cost pricing at the top tier, the ¯rst order conditions
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¢ marginal cost
= 0 (15)
An important factor is the shape of the land density function g(°). The
tiered pricing solution will be very di®erent if most of the density is located
near the center of the distribution or if most of the density is near the upper
and lower limits. For certain land density functions, tiered pricing can achieve
the ¯rst-best solution, while still satisfying the balance budget requirement.
If the tier is set so that every water user is in the top tier, water use will
12reproduce the ¯rst-best solution. There could be multiple sets of (x0;w0)
that satisfy the ¯rst order conditions of the problem.
Proposition 2 If the pair (x0;w0) is chosen so that 0 < x0 < x¤(°;wM),
then the ¯rst-best outcome can be achieved through tiered pricing.
Proof of Proposition 2: See appendix.
Proposition 3 if 0 < x0 < x¤(°;wM), the choice of (x0;w0) does not a®ect
the measure of inequality.
Proof of Proposition 3: See appendix.
Proposition 4 If x0 is determined by other considerations, such as a lifeline
quantity (chosen by a measure of a minimal need) and x0 > x¤(°;wM), then
² the ine±ciency resulting from tiered pricing is increasing in x0.
² the ine±ciency is exacerbated when a large proportion of the land is of
moderate quality.
² the ine±ciency is decreasing in the responsiveness of the yield function
(f(x;°)) to higher input use.
Proof of Proposition 4: See appendix.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a framework for analyzing equity and e±-
ciency measures of resource use when users of that resource are heterogeneous
in their characteristics and demand. One result that we show is that the tail
end of the distribution of users will determine whether tiered pricing is e±-
cient, while the moments of the distribution will determine the measure of
loss when there is ine±ciency. We identify two sources of ine±ciency with
tiered pricing - a level of entry that is too high and excessive use by existing
users. These are e®ects at the intensive and extensive margins, and both
will create ine±ciency. The parameters of the distribution of users and their
demand will determine the relative importance of each source of distortion.
13The next step is to analyze certain production and distribution functions.
This can be done both analytically and with a simulation program. One
production function that has been used to look at agriculture is a quadratic
production function, such has been done by Caswell and Zilberman [2] in
modeling the California cotton industry.
Other production functions that are often used in analyzing agricul-
tural production are a Von-Liebig (¯xed proportion) technology, or a Cobb-
Douglas production function.
These extensions, along with an examination of other water-pricing poli-
cies are the next step in this research. The question of choosing an appropri-
ate water-pricing policy is extremely important and timely. As the number
of people in water scarce regions and the environmental needs for clean water
grow, disputes over water use and water rights are certain to be a part of our
future.
14A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1: The welfare loss under average cost pricing is increasing in
the slope of the variable cost function (V (X)), and is decreasing in the rate
of change of yield (f(x;°)) to greater levels of inputs.
In this proposition, we make two claims. To show they are correct, we
¯rst remind the reader of the measurement of ine±ciency we use when users
pay the same price for each unit consumed. We consider the traditional
measure of deadweight loss, and approximate this with a triangular area for










For the ¯rst claim, we consider how a change in the slope of the variable
cost function (mathematically a change in V 0(X)) changes the measure of











¤, this expression is positive. Therefore, deadweight loss
increases as the slope of the variable cost function increases. It is important
to note that since consumers respond to the price charged (wA), the total
quantity used (X
A) does not depend on the cost function.
For the second claim, we ¯rst note that the aggregate demand (X) for a
resource at a single price is simply the sum of all individual demands. There-
fore, we consider the impact of the shape of the production function on an
individual's demand. We use the result of the individual pro¯t maximization
that for any input price wi, an individual will set
@f(x;°)
@xi = wi. Taking a
¯rst-order Taylor series expansion around
@f(x;°)









Substituting in the condition for pro¯t maximization and rearranging









@x¤2 is negative by assumption, validating the fact that input
price and quantity demanded are inversely related. This term measures the
rate of change of the yield function in response to changes in input quanti-
ties, and the larger this rate of change, the smaller the change in quantity
demanded after an input price change. The intuition behind this is that if
the change in yield responds quickly to changes in inputs, a smaller change
in inputs is necessary to satisfy the pro¯t maximization condition.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2: If the pair (x0;w0) is chosen so that 0 < x0 < x¤(°;wM), then
the ¯rst-best outcome can be achieved through tiered pricing.
The intuition is that this pricing policy puts all water users in the top tier
- those who buy water e±ciently at marginal cost. As discussed earlier, we
de¯ne the level of ine±ciency as the di®erence between the optimal level of
aggregate resource use and the actual level, as denoted by X
T ¡ X
¤. Using
the categories de¯ned earlier, if x0 < x¤(°;wM), the ¯rst three categories are
empty, and the entire population is in the fourth category. This is the group
that uses water e±ciently at price wM. Under these assumptions, the total








Since wM is equal to the marginal cost of water (V 0(X)), aggregate de-
mand is equivalent to demand under marginal cost pricing. However, a water
utility earns a lower level of pro¯ts than under marginal cost pricing, since
not all units are priced at marginal cost. More speci¯cally, total revenues are
equal to the following expression:







Therefore, the utility can be held to a zero-pro¯t condition, while e±-
ciency in water use among users is still achieved.
16A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3: if 0 < x0 < x¤(°;wM), the choice of (x0;w0) does not a®ect
the measure of inequality.
To show that this is true, we consider the decision from each individual of
how much water to use under tiered pricing and under marginal cost pricing.
As shown in the proof of proposition 2, each individual uses the same amount
of water under both tiered pricing and marginal cost pricing. Therefore, the
distribution of water use under each pricing scheme is identical. Therefore,
while customers pay a lower total price for their water use, the distribution
of quantity used does not change.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 4: If x0 is determined by other considerations, such as a lifeline
quantity (chosen by a measure of a minimal need) and x0 > x¤(°;wM), then
² the ine±ciency resulting from tiered pricing is increasing in x0.
² the ine±ciency is exacerbated when a large proportion of the land is of
moderate quality.
² the ine±ciency is decreasing in the responsiveness of the yield function
(f(x;°)) to higher input use.
We denote the level of ine±ciency by the di®erence between aggregate
water use under marginal cost pricing and under tiered pricing. This di®er-
ence is X
T ¡X
¤. Ine±ciency results from those users who are in the ¯rst and
second category de¯ned earlier - those that set the marginal product of water



















Di®erentiating this expression with respect to the variable x0 and simpli-
















Both components of the expression are non-negative. The ¯rst shows the
increased ine±ciency resulting from a greater proportion of the population
using water ine±ciently. The second component shows how those who are
already using water ine±ciently exacerbate that ine±cient use when the level
of x0 is increased.
For the last part of this statement, refer to the proof of proposition 1,
where we show that a greater responsiveness of the yield function to higher
water use decreases ine±ciency. The same argument holds for the proportion
of the population who buy water below marginal cost under tiered pricing.
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